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Abstract
In this paper we provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value for TU-
games using a fairness property. This property states that if to a game we
add another game in which two players are symmetric then their payos change
by the same amount. We show that the Shapley value is characterized by this
fairness property, eciency and the null player property. These three axioms
also characterize the Shapley value on important subclasses of games, such as
the class of simple games or the class of apex games.
Keywords: TU-game, Shapley value, fairness, simple games.
JEL classication number: C71
1 Introduction
A situation in which a nite set of players can obtain certain payos by cooperation
can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility {or simply a TU-game{
being a pair (N; v), where N = f1; : : : ; ng is the set of players and v: 2N ! IR is a
characteristic function such that v(;) = 0. Since we take the set of players N to be
xed, we represent a TU-game by its characteristic function v. The collection of all
characteristic functions on N is denoted by GN .
A (single valued) solution for TU-games is a function f :GN ! IRN which as-
signs an jN j-dimensional real vector to every TU-game. This vector can be seen as
a distribution of the payos that can be obtained by cooperation over the individual
players in the game. A famous solution is the Shapley value (Shapley (1953a)). Var-
ious axiomatizations of the Shapley value have been given. In this paper we provide
an axiomatization of the Shapley value using eciency, the null player property and a
fairness property. This last property states that if to a game v 2 GN we add a game
w 2 GN in which players i and j are symmetric then the payos of players i and j
change by the same amount, i.e., if w(S [fig) = w(S [fjg) for all S  N n fi; jg then
fi(v + w)  fi(v) = fj(v + w)   fj(v).
This concept of fairness is related to fairness as introduced by Myerson (1977)
for games in which the possibilities of coalition formation in a TU-game are limited
because of the fact that players are part of a limited communication structure. In that
1
model fairness means that deleting a communication relation between two players has
the same eect on both their payos. A similar fairness axiom is used in van den
Brink (1997) for games in which the cooperation possibilities in a TU-game are limited
because the players are part of a hierarchical permission structure in which there are
players who need permission from certain other players before they are allowed to
cooperate. In that model fairness means that deleting a permission relation between
two players has the same eect on both their payos. In van den Brink (1995a) a
fairness axiom for relational power measures for directed graphs1 is introduced. In that
context fairness means that deleting a relation between two nodes in a digraph changes
their relational power by the same amount.
As already noted by Dubey (1975), axiomatizations of the Shapley value on GN
not necessarily characterize the Shapley value on important subclasses of games such
as the class of simple games. A TU-game v is simple if v(S) 2 f0; 1g for all S  N .
It turns out that eciency, the null player property, and fairness also characterize the
Shapley value on the class of simple games. Van den Brink (1995a) shows that these
three axioms characterize the Shapley value on the even smaller class of apex games.
Besides the literature on fairness started in Myerson (1977), this paper also is
related to the axiomatization of the Shapley value by eciency, symmetry and strong
monotonicity given in Young (1985). A solution satises strong monotonicity if for
every pair of games v;w 2 GN and i 2 N , the payo of i in v is at least equal
to its payo in w if the marginal contribution of player i to any coalition in v is
at least equal to its corresponding marginal contribution in w, i.e., fi(v)  fi(w) if
v(S [fig)  v(S)  w(S [fig) w(S) for all S  N n fig. As argued by Chun (1991),
it is sucient to require that fi(v) = fi(w) if v(S[fig) v(S) = w(S [fig) w(S) for
all S  N n fig. So, strong monotonicity essentially compares the payo of a player if
we add a game in which this player is a null player , while fairness compares the change
in payo of two players if we add a game in which these players are symmetric.
1A directed graph is a pair (N;D) where N is a nite set of nodes and D  N  N is a binary
relation on N . A relational power measure for directed graphs is a function that assigns real values to
all nodes in a directed graph. For a general discussion about relational power measures for directed
graphs we refer to van den Brink (1994).
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we dene fairness and show that the
Shapley value is the unique solution on GN that satises eciency, the null player
property and fairness. We also show that these three axioms characterize the Shapley
value on the class of simple games. We end Section 2 by comparing fairness with
strong monotonicity and balanced contributions as considered in, e.g., Myerson (1980)
and Hart and Mass-Colell (1989). In Section 3 we generalize the characterization of
the Shapley value to weighted Shapley values as considered in, e.g., Shapley (1953b)
and Kalai and Samet (1987). Finally, there is an appendix that discusses components
in TU-games which are used in the proof of the main theorem.
2 An axiomatization of the Shapley value
In this section we provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value using eciency, the
null player property and fairness. The Shapley value (Shapley (1953a)) is the function






for all i 2 N;
with dividends v(S) =
P
TS
( 1)jSj jT jv(T ) for all S  N (see Harsanyi (1959)). We
rst state the well-known eciency and null player axioms for solutions f :GN ! IRN .
Player i 2 N is a null player in v 2 GN if v(S) = v(S n fig) for all S  N .
Axiom 2.1 (Eciency) For every v 2 GN it holds that
P
i2N fi(v) = v(N).
Axiom 2.2 (Null player property) If i 2 N is a null player in game v 2 GN then
fi(v) = 0.
Players i; j 2 N are symmetric in v 2 GN if v(S[fig) = v(S[fjg) for all S  N nfi; jg.
Fairness states that if to a game v 2 GN we add a game w 2 GN in which players i and
j are symmetric, then the payos of players i and j change by the same amount.
Axiom 2.3 (Fairness) If i; j 2 N are symmetric players in w 2 GN , then
fi(v + w)  fi(v) = fj(v + w)  fj(v) for all v 2 G
N :
3
It is easy to verify that every solution that satises symmetry and additivity also sat-
ises fairness. A solution f :GN ! IRN satises symmetry if i; j 2 N being symmetric
players in v 2 GN implies that fi(v) = fj(v). Solution f :G
N ! IRN satises additivity
if for every pair of games v;w 2 GN it holds that f(v + w) = f(v) + f(w), where
(v + w) 2 GN is dened by (v + w)(S) = v(S) + w(S) for all S  N .
Proposition 2.4 If f :GN ! IRN satises symmetry and additivity, then f also satis-
es fairness.
Proof
Let f :GN ! IRN satisfy symmetry and additivity. Further, suppose that i; j 2 N are
symmetric in w 2 GN . For every v 2 GN it then holds that
fi(v + w)  fi(v) = fi(v) + fi(w)  fi(v) = fi(w) =
= fj(w) = fj(w) + fj(v)  fj(v) = fj(v + w)   fj(v);
where the rst and sixth equality follow from additivity, and the third equality follows
from symmetry of f . Thus, f satises fairness.
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It is known that the Shapley value is characterized by eciency, the null player property,
symmetry and additivity. By Proposition 2.4 it thus also satises fairness. A solution
that satises fairness need not satisfy symmetry nor additivity. This can be seen from
the solution f :GN ! IRN given by f1(v) = Sh1(v) + 1 and fi(v) = Shi(v)  
1
jN j 1
for i 2 N n f1g. This solution satises fairness but does not satisfy symmetry nor
additivity.
Now we state the main result of the paper.
Theorem 2.5 A solution f :GN ! IRN is equal to the Shapley value if and only if it
satises eciency, the null player property, and fairness.
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For transparancy we split the proof that there can be at most one solution satisfying
eciency, the null player property, and fairness in two parts2. For every v 2 GN we
dene
D(v) = fT  N j v(T ) 6= 0g, and d(v) = jD(v)j: (1)
So, every v 2 GN can be expressed as v =
P
T2D(v)v(T )uT , where uT is the unanimity
game of coalition T  N , i.e., uT (S) = 1 if S  T , and uT (S) = 0 otherwise. We rst
consider games for which there are at most two coalitions with a non-zero dividend.
Lemma 2.6 Let GN2 := fv 2 G
N j d(v)  2g. There can be at most one solution
f :GN2 ! IR
N that satises eciency, the null player property, and fairness.
Proof
Suppose that f :GN2 ! IR
N satises eciency, the null player property, and fairness.
Let v 2 GN2 .
If d(v) = 0 then v is the null game, i.e., v(S) = 0 for all S  N . The null player
property then implies that fi(v) = 0 for all i 2 N .
If d(v) = 1 then v is a multiple of the unanimity game of some coalition T  N , i.e.,
v = cTuT for some T  N and cT 2 IR; cT 6= 0. The null player property implies that
fi(cTuT ) = 0 for all i 2 N n T . Fairness implies that there exists a constant c
 2 IR
such that fi(cTuT ) = c
 for all i 2 T . With eciency it then follows that c = cT
jT j
. So,





if i 2 T
0 otherwise:
If d(v) = 2 then v is the sum of two unanimity games, i.e., v = cTuT + cHuH, with
cT 6= 0; cH 6= 0. We distinguish the following three cases:
2In van den Brink (1995b) the Shapley value is characterized by fairness and component eciency .
A coalition B  N is a component in v 2 GN if v(S) = v(S \B) + v(S nB) for all S  N . A solution
f :GN ! IRN satises component eciency if for every v 2 GN and component B in v it holds thatP
i2B fi(v) = v(B). Clearly, this property implies eciency and the null player property. However,
eciency and the null player property do not imply component eciency. A solution that satises
eciency and the null player property, but does not satisfy component eciency is the normalized
Banzhaf value as characterized in van den Brink and van der Laan (1998).
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1. Suppose that T \H 6= ;.
Clearly, the null player property implies that fi(v) = 0 for all i 2 N n (T [H).
Take a j 2 T \H and let fj(v) = c
.
Fairness implies that fi(v) fi(cHuH) = fj(v) fj(cHuH) for all i 2 T . Similarly,
it follows that fi(v) fi(cTuT ) = fj(v) fj(cTuT ) for all i 2 H. Since d(cHuH) =
d(cTuT ) = 1, we already determined that
(i) fi(cHuH) = 0 and fi(cTuT ) =
cT
jT j
for all i 2 T ;
(ii) fi(cTuT ) = 0 and fi(cHuH) =
cH
jHj





fj(v)  fj(cHuH) + fi(cHuH) = c
   cH
jHj
if i 2 T nH
fj(v)  fj(cTuT ) + fi(cTuT ) = c
   cT
jT j
if i 2 H n T
fj(v)  fj(cHuH) + fi(cHuH) = c
 if i 2 T \H
0 otherwise:
With eciency it follows that
P








be equal to cT + cH . Thus, c

















if i 2 T nH
cH
jHj





if i 2 T \H
0 otherwise:
2. Suppose that T \H = ; and T [H 6= N .
The null player property implies that fi(v) = 0 for all i 2 N n (T [H).
Take a j 2 N n (T [ H). (Note that, by assumption, there is at least one null
player.)
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For every i 2 T , fairness and the fact that fj(v) = fj(cTuT ) = 0, imply that
fi(v)   fi(cTuT ) = fj(v)   fj(cTuT ) = 0. Since d(cTuT ) = 1, we already de-
termined that fi(cTuT ) =
cT
jT j




i 2 T .
Similarly, it follows that fi(v) =
cH
jHj
for all i 2 H. So, f(v) is also uniquely
determined in this case.
3. Suppose that T \H = ; and T [H = N .
Note that d(v) = 2 implies that jN j  2. We distinguish the following two cases
with respect to jN j:
A. We rst consider the case that jN j  3. Suppose without loss of generality
that jT j  2. Take a j 2 T and h 2 H. Further, dene the game w 2 GN
by
w = v + cTu(Tnfjg)[fhg = cTuT + cTu(Tnfjg)[fhg+ cHuH :
Let fh(w) = c
. Fairness implies that fj(w) fj(cHuH) = fh(w) fh(cHuH).
Since d(cHuH) = 1, we already determined that fj(cHuH) = 0 and fh(cHuH) =
cH
jHj




For every i 2 Hnfhg, fairness implies that fi(w) fi(cTuT+cTu(Tnfjg)[fhg) =
fh(w) fh(cTuT+cTu(Tnfjg)[fhg). Since cTuT+cTu(Tnfjg)[fhg is as considered
under 1 (i.e., T \ ((T n fjg) [ fhg) 6= ;,) we have that fi(w) = fh(w)  




i 2 H n fhg.
For every i 2 T n fjg, fairness implies that fi(w)   fi(cTu(Tnfjg)[fhg) =




for i 2 T nfjg, and fj(cTu(Tnfjg)[fhg) = 0. Thus,











c if i = h
c   cH
jHj
if i = j
c   cT
jT j





if i 2 T n fjg:
With eciency it follows that
P





























if i = h
cT
jT j
if i = j
cH
jHj
if i 2 H n fhg
2cT
jT j
if i 2 T n fjg:
Next we determine the values fi(v); i 2 N . Let fh(v) = c
. Fairness implies
that fi(v) = c
 for all i 2 H.
For every i 2 T n fjg, fairness implies that fi(v)  fi(w) = fh(v)   fh(w),
and thus fi(v) = c





for i 2 T n fjg.
Since fairness also implies that fj(v) = fi(v) for all i 2 T nfjg, and T nfjg 6=














if i 2 T
Eciency determines that
P




cH + cT must be equal
to cT + cH , and thus c












if i 2 H
cT
jT j
if i 2 T:
B. Suppose that jN j = 2, i.e., N = fi; jg and v = ciufig + cjufjg. Suppose
without loss of generality that ci  cj and let fj(v) = c
. The null player
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property implies that fj((ci   cj)ufig) = 0. With eciency it then follows
that fi((ci   cj)ufig) = (ci   cj).
Fairness implies that fi(v)  fi((ci  cj)ufig) = fj(v)  fj((ci   cj)ufig), and
thus fi(v) = c
 + ci   cj . Eciency then implies that fi(v) + fj(v) = 2c
 +
ci cj must be equal to ci+cj , and thus c
 = cj. So, fi(v) = c
+ci cj = ci
and fj(v) = c
 = cj are uniquely determined.
2
To prove that there can be at most one solution satisfying eciency, the null player
property, and fairness on GN , we dene connectedness of players in a TU-game.
Denition 2.7 Players i; j 2 N are connected in v 2 GN if there exists a sequence
of coalitions (T 1; : : : ; Tm) such that
(i) i 2 T 1; j 2 Tm;
(ii) T k \ T k+1 6= ; for all k 2 f1; : : : ;m  1g;
(iii) v(T
k) 6= 0 for all k 2 f1; : : : ;mg.
A coalition B  N such that all i; j 2 N are connected to each other in game v 2 GN is
called a connected coalition in v. A connected coalition B in v 2 GN is a maximal
connected coalition if every T  B; T 6= B, is not a connected coalition in v.
Thus, two players i; j 2 N are connected in game v if there exists a sequence of `active'
coalitions from player i to player j such that every coalition in this sequence has a non-
empty intersection with its neighbouring coalitions. A coalition B  N is a maximal
connected coalition in v 2 GN if and only if the following two conditions are satised:
(i) for every i; j 2 B it holds that i and j are connected in v;
(ii) for every i 2 B and j 2 N nB it holds that i and j are not connected in v.
9
For a discussion of connected coalitions we refer to the appendix of this paper.
Proof of Theorem 2.5
It is well-known that the Shapley value satises eciency and the null player property.
Since the Shapley value satises symmetry and additivity, it follows from Propositon
2.4 that it also satises fairness.
Now, suppose that f :GN ! IRN satises eciency, the null player property, and fair-
ness. Let v 2 GN .
We show that f(v) is uniquely determined by induction on the number d(v) (dened
in equation (1)). By Lemma 2.6, f(v) is uniquely determined for all games v with
d(v)  2.
Proceeding by induction, assume that f(v0) is uniquely determined for all v0 2 GN
with d(v0)  k (k  2), and let d(v) = k + 1. We distinguish the following three cases
with respect to jB(v)j, where B(v) denotes the partition of N into maximal connected
coalitions in v:
1. Suppose that jB(v)j = 1 (meaning that N is a connected coalition in v). (Note
that d(v)  3 implies that jN j  2).
Take a j 2 N . We show that fj(v) is uniquely determined in the following three
steps.
(a)
We dene the sets T k; k 2 f0g [ IN, as follows:
 T 0 = fjg;
 for every k 2 IN
T k =
8>><
















(If i 2 T k then we can say that i is connected to j through k   1 other players.)
(b)
For every k 2 IN with N n
Sk 1
l=0 T
l 6= ;, we show that T k 6= ;.




Since by assumption T k = ;, it holds by denition of the sets T k that there exists





6= ;, T 3 i, and v(T ) 6= 0.





6= ; and T 3 i it holds that
v(T ) = 0. But then i and j are not connected in v. This is in contradiction
with jB(v)j = 1. Thus, T k 6= ;.
From this it follows that there exists an m 2 IN such that
(a) T k 6= ; for all k 2 f0; : : : ;mg,




k = N .
Thus T 0; : : : ; Tm is a partition of N consisting of non-empty sets only.
(c)
Suppose that fj(v) = c
 for some value c 2 IR. Next we determine for every
i 2 N n fjg the value fi(v) as a function of c
 by the following procedure:
Step 1 Let k = 1 and cj = 0 (and thus fj(v) = c
 + cj). Goto Step 2.




and a T  N such that T  fi; hg and v(T ) 6= 0.
Fairness implies that fi(v)  fi(v  v(T )uT ) = fh(v)  fh(v  v(T )uT ):
With the induction hypothesis and the fact that we already determined the
value ch 2 IR for which fh(v) = c
 + ch this yields that
fi(v) = c
 + ch   fh(v  v(T )uT ) + fi(v  v(T )uT ) = c
 + ci; (2)
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where ci := ch   fh(v  v(T )uT ) + fi(v  v(T )uT) is known.
Goto Step 3.
Step 3 If k = m then Stop.
Else let k = k + 1. Goto Step 2.
Since T 0; : : : ; Tm is a partition of N consisting of non-empty sets only, this pro-
cedure determines all values ci; i 2 N . Eciency then implies that
P
i2N fi(v) =
jN j  c +
P
i2N ci = v(N). From this it follows that the value c
 is uniquely de-
termined, and thus the values fi(v); i 2 N , are uniquely determined by equation
(2).
2. If jB(v)j  3, then take a j 2 N and suppose that fj(v) = c
. For every
i 2 N n fjg there is a T 2 D(v) with T \ fi; jg = ;. Fairness then implies that
fi(v) = c
   fj(v   v(T )uT) + fi(v  v(T )uT ). By the induction hypothesis
we determined all fi(v  v(T )uT); i 2 N . Eciency then uniquely determines
c, and thus all fi(v); i 2 N .
3. Finally, suppose that jB(v)j = 2, i.e., B(v) = fB1; B2g. Suppose without loss of
generality that jB2j  2. Take a j 2 B1, and suppose that fj(v) = c
. Fairness
then implies that for every i 2 B1 there is some T 2 2 D(v), T 2  B2, with
fi(v) = c
   fj(v  v(T
2)uT 2) + fi(v  v(T
2)uT 2).
Take a T  B2, T 2 D(v) and h 2 B2 n T . (Such an h exists by assumption.)
Fairness implies that fh(v) = c
   fj(v  v(T )uT ) + fh(v  v(T )uT ).
Finally, for every i 2 B2 n fhg there is a T 1 2 D(v) with T 1  B1, and thus
fairness implies that fi(v) = fh(v)  fh(v  v(T
1)uT 1) + fj(v  v(T
1)uT 1) for
i 2 B2 n fhg. Eciency and the induction hypothesis again uniquely determine
c, and thus all values fi(v); i 2 N .
Thus, there can be at most one solution f :GN ! IRN that satises eciency, the null
player property, and fairness. Since the Shapley value satises these axioms, f must
be equal to the Shapley value.
2
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The independence of the three axioms of Theorem 2.5 can be illustrated by the following
three well-known solutions:






(v(S)  v(S n fig)) for all i 2 N;
satises the null player property and fairness. It does not satisfy eciency. The
Banzhaf value is introduced in Banzhaf (1965) for simple games. Characteriza-
tions of the Banzhaf value for TU-games can be found in, e.g., Lehrer (1988) and
Haller (1994).




for all i 2 N;
satises eciency and fairness. It does not satisfy the null player property.




v(N) for all i 2 N;
satises eciency and the null player property. It does not satisfy fairness. A
characterization of the normalized Banzhaf value can be found in van den Brink
and van der Laan (1998).
Fairness and Young's strong monotonicity do not imply one another, as can be seen
from the following examples:
1. The egalitarian rule :GN ! IRN satises fairness but does not satisfy strong
monotonicity.
13
2. Let f :GN ! IRN be given by fi(v) =
8<
: Shi(v) if i = 10 else:
This solution satises strong monotonicity but does not satisfy fairness.
As noted by Dubey (1975), axioms that caharacterize the Shapley value on GN need
not characterize the Shapley value on the class of simple games. A TU-game v 2 GN
is a simple game if v(S) 2 f0; 1g for all S  N . However, eciency, the null player
property, and fairness do characterize the Shapley value on the class GNS which consists
of all simple games on N . If we restrict ourselves to GNS then eciency and the null
player property are required only for simple games. Fairness is required for pairs of
simple games v;w 2 GNS for which the sum game (v + w) also is a simple game.
Theorem 2.8 A solution f :GNS ! IR
N is equal to the Shapley value if and only if it
satises eciency, the null player property, and fairness on GNS .
Proof
The Shapley value satises eciency, the null player property and fairness on GNS since
it satises these properties on GN  GNS .
Now, suppose that f :GNS ! IR
N satises eciency, the null player property and fairness
on GNS , and let v 2 G
N
S . We dene
Ds(v) = fT  N j v(T ) = 1g, and ds(v) = jDs(v)j:
We show that f(v) = Sh(v) by induction on the number ds(v).
If ds(v) = 0 then v is the null game, and the null player property implies that fi(v) = 0
for all i 2 N . Thus, f(v) = Sh(v) in this case.
If ds(v) = 1 then v is the standard game3 of some coalition T  N , i.e., v = bT for
some T  N . Now we rst consider the corresponding unanimity game uT . (Note that
every unanimity game is a simple game.) Similarly as in the proof of Lemma 2.6 it
follows that fi(uT ) =
1
jT j
if i 2 T , and fi(uT ) = 0 otherwise.
Next we determine f(bT ) by the following procedure:
3The standard game bT of coalition T  N is given by bT (S) = 1 if S = T , and bT (S) = 0,
otherwise.
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0) = c0 for all
i 2 T and fi(v
0) = 0 for all i 2 H0). Goto Step 2.
Step 2 If Hk = ; then Stop.





The null player property implies that fi(v) = 0 for all i 2 H
k n fjg.
Since all fi(uT ) are equal for i 2 T , fairness implies that there exists a c
k+1 2 IR
such that fi(v
k+1) = ck+1 for all i 2 T .





k) = ck+1   ck + fj(v
k).
Applying fairness to uT and v
k+1 then also yields that fi(v
k+1) = fj(v
k+1) for all






ck+1 , if i 2 T
ck+1   ck + fj(v
k) , if i 2 (N n (T [Hk)) [ fjg)
0 , if i 2 Hk n fjg:
Since ck+1 is the only unkown, eciency uniquely determines ck+1, and thus
f(vk+1). Goto Step 3.
Step 3 Let k = k + 1 and Hk = Hk 1 n fjg. Goto Step 2.
By this procedure we have determined f(bT ).
If ds(v) = 2 then v = bT + bH for some T;H  N; T 6= H, and f(v) is determined
in a way similar as the case d(v) = 2 in the proof of Lemma 2.6, but with the role
of unanimity games replaced by standard games. Besides replacing unanimity games
by standard games, we also should avoid the null player property since this property
cannot be used in this case. We do this as follows. In the case T \ H 6= ;, assume
without loss of generality that T nH 6= ;. Take an h 2 T nH. For every i 2 N n(T [H),
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fairness implies that fi(v) fi(bT ) = fh(v) fh(bT ). Since fi(bT ) and fh(bT ) are known,
and fh(v) is expressed as c
 plus a known constant, we also have expressed fi(v) as c

plus a known constant. Eciency, again determines c, and thus f(v) is determined.
In a similar way the null player property can be avoided in case T \ H =
;; T [ H 6= N . (In the third and last case, T \ H = ;; T [H = N , the null player
property is not used.)
Proceeding by induction we assume that f(v0) = Sh(v0) for all v0 2 GNS with d
s(v0)  k
(k  2), and let ds(v) = k+1. Again, it can be shown that f(v) is uniquely determined
by replacing unanimity games in the proof of Theorem 2.5 by standard games, and
replacing connected coalitions in v by standard connected coalitions in v. Here, we
dene two players i; j 2 N to be standard connected in v if there exists a sequence
of coalitions (T 1; : : : ; Tm) such that
(i) i 2 T 1; j 2 Tm;
(ii) T k \ T k+1 6= ; for all k 2 f1; : : : ;m  1g;
(iii) v(T k) 6= 0 for all k 2 f1; : : : ;mg.
Then we denote by Bs(v) the partition of N into maximal standard connected coali-
tions, where B  N is a maximal standard connected coalition in v if and only
if the following two conditions are satised:
(i) for every i; j 2 B it holds that i and j are standard connected in v;
(ii) for every i 2 B and j 2 N nB it holds that i and j are not standard connected
in v.
2
For the smaller class of apex games, van den Brink (1995a) shows that eciency,
the null player property and fairness characterize the Shapley value on this class of
games. The apex game aj;J , j 2 N , J  N n fjg, assigns the value one to every
coalition that either contains J or contains the apex player j and at least one player
from J . All other coalitions are assigned the value zero. This fairness property for
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apex games states that making a non-apex player a null player changes the payos
of this non-apex player and the apex player by the same amount if jJ j  2, i.e.,
fi(aj;J)  fi(aj;Jnfig) = fj(aj;J)  fj(aj;Jnfig) for all i 2 J , jJ j  2.
Although the purpose of this paper is to characterize the Shapley value on classes of
games with xed player set N , we conclude this section by comparing fairness with the
concept of balanced contributions as considered in, e.g., Myerson (1980) and Hart and
Mas-Colell (1989). This property is stated for games with variable sets of players. In
order to state this property, we therefore denote in this paragraph a TU-game as a pair
(N; v), and by G we denote the collection of all TU-games. For a characteristic function
v on N and coalition T  N we denote by vT the restricted characteristic function on
T given by vT (S) = v(S) for all S  T . A solution on G is a function f that assigns to
every game (N; v) 2 G an jN j-dimensional real vector representing a payo distribution
over the players in N . (Thus, to games with player sets of dierent size such a solution
assigns vectors of dierent dimension.) A solution on G has balanced contributions
if for every (N; v) 2 G and i; j 2 N it holds that4 fi(N; v)   fi(N n fjg; vNnfjg) =
fj(N; v)  fj(N n fig; vNnfig).
It is easy to verify that the egalitarian rule satises fairness5 but does not have
balanced contributions. Under the assumptions that a solution f on G satises single
player eciency6 and permutation neutrality7 it holds that f satises fairness if it has
balanced contributions.
Proposition 2.9 If f is a solution for TU-games that satises single player eciency,
permutation neutrality and has balanced contributions, then f satises fairness.
4For convenience we write f(N; v) instead of f((N; v)).
5Here fairness is dened on the class G in a straightforward manner.
6A solution f on G satises single player eciency if it is ecient for all 1-player games, i.e., if
fi(fig; v) = v(fig) for all (N; v) 2 G with jN j = 1.
7A solution f on G satises permutation neutrality if for every (N; v) 2 G, N  N , permutation
:N ! N , and player i 2 N with (i) = i it holds that fi(N; v) = fi(N; v), where N =
S
j2N (j),
and the characteristic function v on N is given by v(S) = v(
S
j2S (j)) for all S  N .
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Proof
Let f be a solution on G that satises single player eciency, permutation neutrality,
and has balanced contributions. Further, let (N; v); (N;w) 2 G, and i; j 2 N be such
that i and j are symmetric in w. We show that f satises fairness by induction on the
number of players in N .
If jN j = 1 then single player eciency implies that fi(N; v) = v(fig) for i 2 N .
If jN j = 2, i.e., N = fi; jg, then f having balanced contributions implies that
fi(N; v + w)  fj(N; v + w) = fi(N n fjg; (v + w)Nnfjg)  fj(N n fig; (v + w)Nnfig)
= (v + w)(fig)  (v + w)(fjg) = v(fig)  v(fjg)
= fi(N n fjg; vNnfjg)  fj(N n fig; vNnfig)
= fi(N; v)  fj(N; v):
Proceeding by induction we assume that fi(N
0; v0+w0)  fi(N
0; v0) = fj(N
0; v0+w0) 
fj(N
0; v0) for all (N 0; v0) 2 G with jN 0j  k, and i; j symmetric in w0.
Let jN j = k + 1, and h 2 N n fi; jg. (Such an h exists since jN j  3.) Since f has
balanced contributions it holds that
fi(N; v + w)  fh(N; v + w) = fi(N n fhg; (v + w)Nnfhg)  fh(N n fig; (v + w)Nnfig);
and
fj(N; v + w)  fh(N; v + w) = fj(N n fhg; (v + w)Nnfhg)  fh(N n fjg; (v + w)Nnfjg):
Using the induction hypothesis and the facts that f has balanced contributions and
satises permutation neutrality it then follows that
fi(N; v + w)  fj(N; v + w) = fi(N n fhg; (v + w)Nnfhg)  fj(N n fhg; (v + w)Nnfhg)
= fi(N n fhg; vNnfhg)  fj(N n fhg; vNnfhg)
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= fi(N; v)  fh(N; v) + fh(N n fig; vNnfig)
 fj(N; v) + fh(N; v)  fh(N n fjg; vNnfjg)
= fi(N; v)  fj(N; v):
Thus, f satises fairness.
2
3 Weighted Shapley values
In the literature various kinds of weighted Shapley values have been studied. An ex-
ample of such a weighted Shapley value is the one considered in Shapley (1953b). This
weighted Shapley value is the function Shw:GN  IRN++ ! IR
N given by







v(S) for all i 2 N;
where  = (1; : : : ; n) 2 IR
N
++ is a vector that assigns positive weights to the players
in N . If i = 1 for all i 2 N then Sh
w(v; ) = Sh(v) for all v 2 GN . Thus, Shw is a
generalization of the Shapley value.
For functions f :GN  IRN++ ! IR
N , ecieny and the null player property can be
generalized in a straigthforward way.
Axiom 3.1 (-eciency) For every v 2 GN , and  2 IRN++ it holds that
P
i2N fi(v; ) =
v(N).
Axiom 3.2 (-null player property) For every v 2 GN and  2 IR++ it holds that
fi(v; ) = 0 if i is a null player in v.
Thus, the sum of the payos that are assigned to the players in N is equal to the
worth v(N) irrespective of the weights that are assigned to the players. Similarly, a
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null player always gets a zero payo, irrespective of the weights. We generalize fairness
in the following way.
Axiom 3.3 (-fairness) Let  2 IRN++, and let i; j 2 N be symmetric in w 2 G
N .
For every v 2 GN it holds that j(fi(v + w)  fi(v)) = i(fj(v + w)  fj(v)).
Note that for  2 IRN++ with i = 1 for all i 2 N , these axioms boil down to the
corresponding axioms stated in Section 2.
Theorem 3.4 A function f :GN  IRN++ ! IR
N is equal to the weighted Shapley value
Shw if and only if it satises -eciency, the -null player property, and -fairness.
The proof is obtained by adapting the proof of Theorem 2.5 in a straightforward way
(in particular, the use of fairness), and is therefore omitted.
Another type of weighted Shapley value has been considered in Kalai and Samet (1987).
A weight system is a pair ! = (;), where  2 IRN++ is a vector of weights and
 = (S1; : : : ; Sm) is an ordered partition of N . Let SN denote the collection of all
ordered partitions of N . For every  = (S1; : : : ; Sm) 2 SN and S  N we denote
k(S) = maxfk 2 f1; : : : ;mg j S\S
k 6= ;g, and K(S) = S\S
k(S). The KS-weighted
Shapley value is the function Shks:GN  IRN++  S
N ! IRN given by








v(S) for all i 2 N:
If  = (N) then Shks(v; ;) = Shw(v; ) for all v 2 GN and  2 IRN++. Thus, Sh
ks is a
generalization of Shw (and thus also a generalization of Sh). We generalize -eciency,
the -null player property, and -fairness in the following way.
Axiom 3.5 (;-eciency) For every v 2 GN ,  2 IRN++, and  2 S
N it holds thatP
i2N fi(v; ;) = v(N).
Axiom 3.6 (;-null player property) For every v 2 GN ,  2 IR++ and  2 S
N
it holds that fi(v; ;) = 0 if i is a null player in v.
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Thus, the sum of the payos that are assigned to the players in N again is equal to the
worth v(N) irrespective of the weights that are assigned to the players and the way the
players are ordered in the partition . Similarly, null players earn nothing irrespective
of the weights and the ordering of the players in the partition .
Axiom 3.7 (;-fairness) Let  2 IRN++,  = (S
1; : : : ; Sm) 2 SN , and let i 2 Sk
and j 2 Sl, k; l 2 f1; : : : ;mg, be symmetric in w 2 GN . For every v 2 GN it holds
that
(i) j(fi(v + w)  fi(v)) = i(fj(v + w)  fj(v)) if k = l;
(ii) fi(v + w)  fi(v) = 0 if k < l.
Again, by adapting the proof of Theorem 2.5 it can be shown that the KS-weighted
Shapley value is the unique function f :GN  IRN++  S
N ! IRN that satises ;-
eciency, the ;-null player property, and ;-fairness.
Appendix: connected coalitions and components in
TU-games
Maximal connected coalitions as used in the proof of Theorem 2.5 coincide with minimal
components in TU-games. Components in TU-games are already considered in, e.g.,
Aumann and Dreze (1974) and Chang and Kan (1994). A coalition B  N is a
component in game v 2 GN if it acts `independently' of the players in N n B, in the
sense that the worth of any coalition S  N is equal to the worth that can be obtained
by those players in S who also belong to B plus the worth that can be obtained by the
coalition of other players in S. A component is called a minimal component in a game
if all its strict subsets are not components in that game.
Denition 3.8 Let v 2 GN . Coalition B  N is a component in v if
v(S) = v(S \B) + v(S nB) for all S  N:
Coalition B  N is a minimal component in v if B is a component in v and every
T  B, T 6= B, is not a component in v.
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It is easy to show that the empty set and the `grand coalition' N are components in
every v 2 GN . Moreover, for every pair of components in v it holds that their union and
their intersection both are components in v. (This is shown in van den Brink (1995b).
For completeness we give the proof below.)
Theorem A.1 For every v 2 GN it holds that (i) ; and N are components in v, and
(ii) if B1; B2  N are components in v then B1 [ B2 and B1 \ B2 are components in
v.
Proof
Let v 2 GN . Then
(i) for every S  N it holds that v(S \ ;) + v(S n ;) = v(;) + v(S) = v(S), and
v(S \N) + v(S nN) = v(S) + v(;) = v(S).
(ii) for every pair of components B1; B2  N in v, repeatedly applying the deni-
tion of a component yields that for every S  N it holds that
v(S \ (B1 [B2)) + v(S n (B1 [ B2)) =
= v((S \ (B1 [B2)) \B1) + v((S \ (B1 [B2)) nB1) + v((S nB1) nB2)
= v(S \ B1) + v((S \ B2) nB1) + v(S nB1)  v((S nB1) \B2)
= v(S \ B1) + v(S nB1) = v(S);
and
v(S \ (B1 \B2)) + v(S n (B1 \ B2)) =
v((S \B1) \B2) + v((S n (B1 \ B2)) \B1) + v((S n (B1 \B2)) nB1) =
= v(S \ B1)  v((S \B1) nB2) + v((S nB2) \B1) + v(S nB1) =
= v(S \ B1) + v(S nB1) = v(S):
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2
From this theorem it follows that for every game v there is a unique partition B =
(B1; : : : ; Bm) of N such that every Bk; k 2 f1; : : : ;mg, in this partition is a minimal
component in v.
Components in game v can be characterized by connectedness of players. It
turns out that a coalition B  N is a component in game v if and only if for every
pair of players i 2 B and j 2 N nB it holds that i and j are not connected in v.
Lemma A.2 Let v 2 GN . Coalition B  N is a component in v if and only if for every
i 2 B and j 2 N nB it holds that i and j are not connected in v.
Proof
Let v 2 GN .
Only if
Let B be a component in v, and let i 2 B and j 2 N n B. Suppose that i and j are
connected in v. Then there exists an S  N such that
(i) S \B 6= ;; S 6 B, v(S) 6= 0;
(ii) v(T ) = 0 for every T  S with T \B 6= ; and T 6 B.
(Note that it is not necessary that S 3 i nor T 3 j.) Since v =
P
TN v(T )uT it holds
that




























v(T ) = v(S):
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This is in contradiction with B being a component in v. Thus, i and j are not connected
in v.
If
Let B  N . Suppose that for every i 2 B and j 2 N nB it holds that i and j are not
connected in v. Then v(T ) = 0 for all T  N with T \B 6= ; and T 6 B. But then,
for every S  N , it holds that





















v(T ) = v(S):
Thus, B is a component in v.
2
Moreover, component B is a minimal component in v if and only if for every pair of
players i; j 2 B it holds that i and j are connected in v.
Lemma A.3 Let B  N be a component in v 2 GN . Then B is a minimal component
in v if and only if for every i; j 2 B it holds that i and j are connected in v.
Proof
Let v 2 GN and let B  N be a component in v.
Only if
Suppose that there exist i; j 2 B such that i and j are not connected in v.
Let H := fh 2 B j i and h are connected in vg. Then B nH 3 j.
By denition of connectedness it holds that v(T ) = 0 for every T  N with T \H 6= ;
and T 6 H. By B being a component in v and H  B it follows that for every S  N
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it holds that
v(S \ H) + v(S nH) = v(S \H) + v((S nH) \B) + v((S nH) nB)






















v(T ) + v(S nB) = v(S \B) + v(S nB) = v(S):
Thus, H is a component in v. Since H  B, H 6= B, this implies that B is not a
minimal component in v.
If
Suppose that B is not a minimal component in v, i.e., there exists a T  B, T 6= B,
such that T is a component in v. From Lemma A.2 it then follows that for every i 2 T
and j 2 B n T it holds that i and j are not connected in v.
2
Combining Lemma's A.2 and A.3 yields the following theorem.
Theorem A.4 Let v 2 GN . Then B is a minimal component in v if and only if B is a
maximal connected coalition in v.
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